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1. Introduction
** 
The general theory on the enforcement of laws, as it is well known, generally focuses on the 
adoption of the best instruments and methods to detect violators of legal rules and to impose 
sanctions. Enforcement activities consist, in fact, of all those mechanisms, such as detection, 
prosecution and punishment, designed to punish and to bring an individual or a firm to comply with 
formal regulations. This paper aims, first of all, to provide some insights on the economic effects 
related to the diverse enforcement strategies adopted by legal institutions in both Civil Law and 
Common Law countries and, secondly, to underline the crucial role that institutions play in the 
environmental enforcement throughout the development and the implementation of the 
environmental policies. In order to fully understand the reasons underlying these differences, it is 
necessary to make, in a comparative perspective, some considerations on the different legal 
systems, their structural modes of working in respect to the different juridical institutions. 
As it is well known, the first analysis in the field of law enforcement, from an economic 
perspective, began with Beccaria and Bentham, but its renaissance in modern times dates only from 
1968, with Gary Becker’s article on the economics of crime and punishment, which has led to a 
huge literature; among all, the work by Polinsky and Shavell (2000) represents certainly the most 
comprehensive analysis on the public enforcement of law.  As it is well known, the basic result of 
deterrence theory is that potential violators behave according to both the probability of detection 
and the severity of the sanction; thus, deterrence may be improved either by raising the sanction, or 
by increasing the expenditures on enforcement to raise the likelihood that the violator will be 
captured,
1 or again by changing the legal rules to increase the probability of detection (Cohen, 
1998). 
                                                 
 
** The work upon this paper is based was presented in a seminar held in the Department of Economics, Mathematics 
and Statistics at the University of Foggia. I am particularly thankful to C. Imbriani for encouraging me in writing this 
paper and for his many and stimulating discussions on the topic and to P. Morone for his valuable comments for 
constructive criticisms. 
1 In Becker’s model, the efficient level of crime is observable when the marginal cost of enforcement is equal to the 
marginal social benefit of crime reduced per unit of enforcement   3
Considering the enforcement mechanisms with respect to environmental regulations, some 
empirical studies (among others, Cohen, 2000) have showed that generally a high level of 
enforcement (mainly throughout increased inspections) implies a high level of environmental 
quality. It is crucial, then, that when a regulatory agency imposes a new, perhaps, stricter regulation, 
there will be also the right degree of enforcement. As McKean (1980) points out, high enforcement 
costs accompanied with imperfect compliance, make regulations less effective than desired; thus, 
monitoring and enforcement concerns “should influence choices about how to regulate, and in some 
instances, about whether to regulate at all”. 
All these matters have definitely to be considered from legislators and policy makers in order to 
identify, among others objectives, a) how much of society’s resources should be spent on 
enforcement in order to capture violators; b) should the sanction be a fine, imprisonment or a 
combination of the two; c) how should enforcement policies be adjusted as enforcement cost 
change. These are, in fact, just some of the most critical issues that characterize the social welfare 
maximization problem from the side of the institutions. But also the legal systems characterizing the 
common law and the civil law countries have important effects on the development of 
environmental enforcement policies. So, in the following paragraphs, particular attention will be 
given to how the enforcement approaches chosen by the US and the EU institutions can deter firms 
from committing illegal activities.  
 
2. Environmental Enforcement and Firms’ Compliance: the Economic Role of Institutions 
In order to identify the economic efficiency implications based upon the theory of public 
enforcement of environmental laws, it is necessary to review the main theoretical contributions of 
the economic literature on enforcement and firms’ compliance. Providing some plausible 
explanations for the different environmental enforcement approaches between US and EU, will help 
us understanding how institutions and enforcement authorities can decide what kind of enforcement   4
(administrative, civil or criminal) to pursue and, consequently, what type and degree of sanction 
(monetary or non-monetary) can be imposed. 
From a theoretical point of view, in the literature, as already said, since Becker’s (1968) 
seminal article there has been a conspicuous amount of economic research and economists focused 
their attention mostly in studying the optimal allocation of resources in order to reduce illegal 
behaviors. According to Becker, the authorities have, primarily, to determine the amount of 
resources to prevent offenses and to apprehend offenders. In particular, Becker tries to find those 
expenditures on law enforcement and punishments that minimize the social loss (the sum of 
damages, costs of apprehension and conviction, and costs of carrying out the punishments). In the 
basic model of enforcement, the individual’s decision on whether to carry out an illegal behavior or 
not is the rational outcome of comparing costs (expected sanctions, social costs, stigma, etc.) and 
benefits (illegal gains, psychological gain, etc.) deriving from the unlawful action. 
One of the primary goals of environmental enforcement is deterrence; in any regulatory 
situations, some individuals will comply voluntarily, some will not comply, and some will comply 
only if they see that others receive a sanction for noncompliance. In fact, deterrence is just that 
phenomenon for which individuals will change their behaviors to avoid a sanction. In the vast 
economic literature on enforcement, many are the factors that have been identified as motivating 
compliance (such as, among others, the desire to avoid a penalty/future liability, desire to save 
money by using more cost-efficient and environmentally sound practices, moral and social values 
for environmental quality, desire to avoid jail, the stigma of enforcement, etc.), as well as many are 
the barriers to compliance (such as, for example, lack of social respect for the law, desire to achieve 
competitive advantages, ignorance about requirements, unavailable or unreliable technologies, etc.).      
The notable and integrative article by Polinsky and Shavell (2000) represents one of the most 
comprehensive analyses of the public enforcement of law; this theory, exactly, starting from the   5
simple Becker’s model, then, pass to analyze a variety of plausible scenarios with respect to the 
choice between fines and imprisonment as a form of socially desirable penalties.
2  
Many additional hypotheses can be introduced in order to extend the basic theory’s results. 
Accidental harms,










just some of the extensions that can change the determination of the expected utility calculation, 
changing, therefore, the probability, form and level of sanctions that individual would then face. 
Several other authors have extended Becker’s ideas in different ways. In a model of optimal 
enforcement by Malik (1990) offenders can engage in activities that reduce the probability of being 
caught and fined. As in other extensions - such as the one by Polinsky and Shavell (1991) where 
wealth varies among individuals, or the model by Bebchuk and Kaplow (1993) who consider the 
possibility that individuals are not all equally easy to apprehend - the optimal fines turn out to be 
less than those proposed by Becker. Polinsky and Shavell (1992) find that the optimal fine equals 
the harm, properly inflated for the chance of not being detected, plus the variable enforcement cost 
of imposing the fine.  In a previous work, Shavell (1985) emphasized that it is not difficult to give 
examples of conflict between the real use of monetary and non-monetary sanctions and their 
theoretically optimal use as deterrents; in practice, in fact, can be found many occasions where a 
person with substantial assets is sentenced to prison but pays no fine or only a modest one. If so, a 
saving in social resources could be achieved by reducing prison sentences and making greater use 
of fine. An example of plausibly insufficient use of imprisonment may also be given. Where firms 
                                                 
2 For a complete analysis of a model in which two types of enforcement efforts, specific and general, are distinguished, 
see S. Shavell, “Specific versus General Enforcement of Law,” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 99, no.5, 1991. 
3 See Shavell, 1993. 
4 See Kaplow and Shavell, 1994a; Block and Sidak (1980). 
5 See Friedman and Sjostrom (1993), Mookherjee and Png (1994), Shavell (1992), and Wilde (1992). 
6 See Landsberger and Meilijson (1982), Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1991), Polinsky and Shavell (1998). 
7 See Innes (2000), Kaplow and Shavell (1994b), Malik (1993). 
8 See for example Froeb (1993), Reinganum (1988) and Miceli (1996). 
9 See Becker and Stigler (1974), Klitgaard (1988), Shleifer and Vishny (1993), Bowles and Garoupa (1997), 
Mookherjee and Png (1995), Polinsky and Shavell (1999). 
10 See Newman and Wright (1990), Tirole (1986), Kornhauser (1982), Polinsky and Shavell (1993). 
11 See Shavell (1987b).   6
might cause harms much greater than their worth or where the harms would be difficult to 
investigate, tort liability may not create an adequate level of deterrence. These examples represent 
the possibilities for the courts and the legislature to achieve social gains through an altered use of 
fines and imprisonment. 
Standard theory predicts that a firm will comply with a regulation when its compliance costs 
are less than the expected penalty associated with violation. Frequent monitoring and relatively high 
fines will be necessary to deter firms from violating regulations. An evident economic reason for 
compliance is that firms respond to both positive and negative incentives; if expected penalties are 
sufficiently high, the threat of being punished for noncompliance should be an adequate reason. 
However, as Russell, Harrington and Vaughn (1986) and Harrington (1988) note, government-
monitoring activities are often quite limited. Moreover, even if discovered to be in noncompliance, 
fines are low and too often inadequate to deter firm to pollute. Despite these facts - low inspection 
probabilities and small fines being imposed - however, compliance is generally considered to be 
high. Winston Harrington (1988) has noted the following paradox: firms’ rate of compliance is high 
even though the EPA’s enforcement activity is carried on at still low levels and often violations are 
not punished even if discovered.
12 
To explain the phenomenon of high compliance in the absence of strict enforcement, 
Harrington (1988), Harford and Harrington (1991), and Harford (1991) adapted existing models of 
income tax enforcement to study enforcement strategies when government policies depend on the 
firm’s previous compliance status.
13 It has been shown that it is possible to achieve a very high 
compliance level with almost no social cost. Consistently with the Harrington paradox, Heyes and 
Rickman (1999) show, in a static model consistent with the same set of stylized facts, that the 
                                                 
12 Harrington shows evidence of these and other stylized facts on pages 29-32. “The reticence to use penalties is 
exhibited in table 1, which reports the results of an RFF survey of state-level enforcement activity conducted in 1984. 
As shown, most states levied penalties for less than 5 percent of the notices of violation (NOVs) issued each year. Also, 
the size of the penalties is generally very small” (Harrington, 1988: 30-31). 
13 In the Harrington model, the basic idea is that firms are assigned to groups based upon their compliance history. 
Ignoring firms that are never monitored, a simple two-group scheme would involve firms found to be in compliance at 
their last inspection (group 1) and those found to be out of compliance at their last inspection (group 2). Group 2 firms 
would be subject to a higher monitoring probability, to stricter regulatory standards, or to higher fines than would firms 
in group 1.   7
introduction of regulatory dealing
14 will enhance compliance and will improve the environmental 
performance of the industry. In other words, the enforcement agency uses of tolerance in some 
context and for some violations can increase compliance in other contexts and for other violations, 
with the main objective of maximizing the overall environmental protection. 
Another significant work on the role of institutions (i..e. enforcement authority) is the one 
provided by Helland (1998) in which he demonstrates that targeting
15 produces more cooperation in 
the form of self-reporting and, thus, encourages firms to report violations they detect. The optimal 
targeting scheme is also studied by Friesen (2003) who shows that adopting the optimal two-group 
targeting scheme can provide additional cost savings for an enforcement agency even over the 
scheme suggested by Harrington. Recently, Lando and Shavell (2004) have also demonstrated that 
there is an intrinsic advantage in focusing law enforcement effort on a subgroup of possible 
violators, rather than applying law enforcement effort uniformly over the potential violators.  
But the threat of being placed on the enforcement agency’s target list is not the only reason 
for compliance. Downing and Kimball (1982) documented the low penalties for noncompliance and 
the relatively high compliance rates in the U.S., observing that firms receive some subsidies in the 
form of tax breaks and special financing. They also argue that industry might want severe regulation 
as an entry barrier to new firms. Finally, they remark that risk aversion might help to explain 
compliance as well as corporate image or reputation. Some surveys that provide this evidence can 
be found in Cahill and Kane (1994), Zerbe (1996), and Doonan, Lanoie and Laplante (1998). 
It is also possible, for example, that managers who make the decisions about compliance 
simply believe that compliance is the right thing to do. In other words, social norms might operate 
to generate significant compliance rates, even without the threat of penalties. The role of society 
                                                 
14 A regulatory deal involves the agency agreeing to tolerate non-compliance in some sub-set of domains in “exchange” 
for compliance in others. 
15 In targeting models, a regulatory industry is divided into two groups: good firms and bad firms. Bad firms have a 
history of violations and they are inspected more frequently. Because inspections are costly, firms attempt to move into 
the good firm category by cooperating with the regulator. The alternative to targeting is to raise the probability of 
inspection for all firms. In the absence of perfect information, targeting strategies are superior in achieving the highest 
possible compliance rate for a given regulatory budget constraint.   8
pressure and other forms of informal sanctions are explored, among others, in Arora and Cason 
(1996), and Konar and Cohen (1998). These works and the non-economic environmental 
compliance literature find support for informal society pressure and social norms as playing an 
important role in compliance. 
An interesting question that has not often been discussed in the literature is the extent to 
which enforcement and compliance differs with the level of government in a federal system. Should 
monitoring and enforcement be delegated to a state or local jurisdiction, or remain with the Federal 
enforcement agency? Burby and Paterson (1993), in their analysis, study compliance under two 
different enforcement agencies, a state-level enforcer and a local enforcement authority, with the 
objective of investigating whether delegating enforcement authority to the local level will result in 
more or less compliance. The theory is ambiguous on this issue: a decentralized enforcement 
agency might be overly concerned with local and specific problem (job losses, for example) and 
could be characterized, therefore, by a less stringent enforcement, but at the same time, it has the 
advantage to know the facilities and individuals within the firm, and has more chances to gain the 
cooperation of local managers. 
Enforcement of laws and enforcer institutions represent, undoubtedly, a crucial element of 
any regulatory policy design and are matters of fundamental importance for promoting social 
welfare. Arruñada and Casari [2007] in their recent experimental paper, analyze how different 
political and judicial institutions may fail to produce enforcement and thus may determine market 
failures. They show, in fact, that some alternative institutional arrangements may 1) produce 
different enforcement results and 2) provide decision makers with different incentive functions, by 
encouraging or discouraging enforcement actions. It is important to remember the influential 
Backhaus’ perspective (1997), which has tried to overcome the hiatus between common law and 
statute law and has provided a really fertile scientific floor by showing that, from an institutional 
comparison of the two systems, not only the common law but also the statute law can be expected 
to develop towards economic efficiency.   9
 The enforcement process can be subdivided, from a theoretical point of view, in different sub-
processes, such as detection, prosecution and punishment. Obviously, each of these stages has direct 
implications not only for the determination of the severity of sanctions and for the choice, for 
example, between fines and imprisonment, but also for the choice between administrative/civil and 
criminal enforcement, and in general for formulating effective policy toward illegal behaviors. 
Besides reviewing the basic predictions suggested by the economic theory of enforcement, as 
we said, there is the ambition of comparing some peculiar aspects, both legal and institutional, that 
characterize the common law and the civil law systems. As also Posner (2004) recently noted, the 
institutional differences between the common and the civil law systems are profound and they have 
mainly to do with the different structures of the two legal systems. In recent years, the United States 
have become increasingly vulnerable to criminal liability for violations of environmental laws and 
this tendency, proved by the recent stiffening of criminal environmental sanctions, suggests that 
tougher enforcement is likely to continue. In Europe, instead, it is possible to observe a different 
approach characterized by a certain degree of reluctance to pursue a firm under criminal law. 
Explaining the reasons of these two different behaviors is not an easy task, but we can probably say 
that they are, at least partially related, to the historical, legal and cultural roots of the two systems. 
In the following paragraphs, some considerations on these issues are given in order to raise the 
necessary distinctions between these different behaviors on the enforcement of environmental laws. 
 
3. E.U. versus U.S.: some Issues at Stake 
In the previous paragraph, we have seen that from an economic point of view, the most 
important and well-known result is that the enforcement authority’s problem is to maximize social 
welfare by choosing, among others, enforcement expenditures, the probability of detection, the type 
of sanction, and, consequently, the level of fine and the length of imprisonment term. However, it is 
a little bit naïve to think of simply applying the prescriptions suggested from the economic theory; 
it is, instead, necessary to get into the single socio-institutional realities and account for the   10
structural differences between the U.S. and the E.U. legal and economic systems. 
The first relevant difference is a structural one (common law versus civil law) and the second 
substantial difference is in the way of spurring enforcement strategies (criminal enforcement vs. 
civil enforcement). Then, there are considerable differences regarding the organizational and 
operational structure of the environmental authorities/institutions. These strong differences between 
the two systems generate very different results and it is definitely in light of these differences that 
the related literature has to be interpreted. Multifold are, therefore, the aspects that we should bear 
in mind; however, we could consider the US and EU legal systems and their environmental 
enforcement authorities/institutions in a representative manner. 
Keeping in consideration the basic theory of public enforcement of law, let us comment now on 
the different enforcement’s approaches and strategies in Europe and in the United States. The 
European authorities have generally adopted both administrative, where possible, and civil judicial 
mechanisms to carry out enforcement programs. Criminal enforcement (which may include 
monetary penalties and imprisonment), instead, has substantial public support in the United States, 
even though it can be significantly costly and involve complex procedures;  the deterrent effects of 
criminal sanctions has been so great that even a relatively small number of successful cases has 
caused other firms to change their business ethics.
16 It is clear that the potential for applying 
criminal enforcement in environmental cases depends on a country's legal system and on whether 
appropriate authorities are provided. 
We said that probably the reasons for the more or less lenient standards, for the more or less 
severe enforcement, for the more or less stringent environmental policy, have to be found in the 
historical, legal and cultural roots of the two systems, which in turn affect also their attitude toward 
sanctions.  In the U.S., the criminalization of environmental law is the latest battleground over the 
definition and the implementation of the enforcement policy. In this respect, a very interesting and, 
at the same time, a very criticized issue (which represents also a fruitful area of study) is the 
                                                 
16 Under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, sentences for environmental crimes can be reduced if the corporate official can 
demonstrate a comprehensive corporate compliance program.    11
efficiency of common law.  Meiners and Yandle in their study (1992) make the case that common 
law in the United States would provide more environmental protection for water and the rest of the 
environment than the whole regulatory process. The nature of the common law lies in the fact that 
the decisions are made by independent judges, responding to independent cases filed by private 
parties. A legal system characterized by these elements, for Meiners and Yandle, is more likely to 
produce sensible principles than legislative bodies that produce rules greatly influenced by special 
interests.
17 They argue that the weakness of federal statutes is in their being influenced by special 
interests and in their intrinsic lack of competitiveness. 
One of the most acknowledged arguments, in the sphere of the traditional law and economic 
theory, is the one that considers the common law system intrinsically more efficient than the civil 
law system, even though recently this issue has been object of strong critiques (i.e, Deffains, 2005). 
The roots for the superiority of the common law system over the civil law have been found 
basically in two issues (Cabrillo, 2007). The first one looks at the common law as a better 
instrument for the defense of individual liberty and democracy (Hayek, 1973); the second argument 
emphasizes the superior capacity of common law in achieving economic efficiency (Posner, 2003). 
Hayek believes in the superiority of common law since the English institutional system was 
administered by judges and courts highly independent from government, in contrast to civil law 
system which is thought to be influenced by the interests of special groups.
18 In his opinion, also, 
common law since consists of a collection of general principles can be better explained and 
developed by judges in their discretionary decisions. 
Posner’s asserted superiority of common law is different from Hayek’s argument given that it is 
based on the idea of efficiency. Landes and Posner (1987) explain why common law tends to be 
efficient, in terms of the well known Hand formula. Accordingly, a person or company should be 
held liable for an accident if the cost of preventing it is less than the expected cost of the accident, 
that is the product of the damage and the probability that an accident would result. So this rule 
                                                 
17 See also Pasour (1996). 
18 See Cooter and Kornhauser (1980), Priest (1977), Rubin (1977).   12
places liability on the party better able to prevent or minimize the damage. The superiority of 
common law is based, therefore, on its assumed better capacity in finding efficient solutions. The 
contended efficiency of common law is also explained by the fact that courts have their own utility-
functions which lead them to choose efficient rules. 
The civil law tradition, instead, has its roots in the Roman law and was adopted by several 
states.
19 The main distinctive feature of the civil law is the embodiment of general principles of law 
in a code, while the most important sources of law in common law jurisdictions are judicial case 
decisions. However, as numerous authors (i.e., Backhaus, 1997; Funken,…; Glaeser and Shleifer, 
2002) in the literature have noted, many common law countries are moving toward codification and 
there is a trend toward convergence of both systems. Furthermore, to the extent that legal rules in 
common law and civil law systems differ, it is hardly clear that the typical civil law rules are less 
efficient (Shavell, 1987a). 
Several political and economic conditions are the starting points to explore the significant 
differences between common law and civil law countries. In literature, it has been argued by some 
authors (La Porta et al. 1999, 2002, Djankov et al. 2002) that although civil law countries are 
characterized by heavier regulations, they show less secure property right, more corrupt and less 
efficient governments, and even less political freedom than do the common law countries. 
Some legal historians (Dawson 1996, Berman 1983, and Damaska 1986) show that the two 
systems have very different strategies for law enforcement and adjudication. Glaeser and Shleifer 
(2002) emphasize the fact that it is important to distinguish between countries that have chosen their 
legal rules and regulations, and countries into which such rules were transplanted. For the countries 
that choose their legal rules, their model suggests that a more extensive regulation facilitates the 
enforcement of laws. The transplantation of a civil law system may lead to less secure property 
rights, heavier intervention and regulation, and more corruption. The transplantation of common 
                                                 
19 The civil law tradition was adopted by several states, including France. Napoleon exported French civil law to the 
other European states; French civil law was later transplanted to Latin America and parts of Africa and Asia.   13
law does not involve these kinds of problems since law enforcement is relatively depoliticized in 
view of the fact that juries and judges are independent. 
As we said, many are the structural differences between common law and civil law that can 
help us to understand the diverse enforcement mechanisms and dynamics. The systematization of 
law is proper of civil law system, while common law consists of case law derived from hundreds of 
thousands of cases. The second argument of difference is the method of judicial construction and 
the role of precedents: the common law would work from case to case, while the civil law would 
reason syllogistically, subsuming a concrete case under a general rule. Another issue in the relation 
between judge made law and statute law is flexibility of law. On the one hand, judge made law is 
more flexible than statute law, especially if courts have the task of filling in open norms and if 
statute law is the result of a process of codification. On the other hand, flexibility of judge made law 
can be weakened by the commitment to precedents; as it has been observed (Kerkmeester and 
Visscher, 2003), it is not possible to give a general opinion regarding the superiority in terms of 
efficiency of one system to the other. 
Some authors argue that there has been a great deal of convergence between common and 
civil law systems in the last decades (Coffee 2000), which means that the two systems have become 
closer and have lead to similar decisions. Although the many differences are still valid, a trend 
towards codification in many common law countries can be observed. For example, Australia, 
England and the United States now have an extensive body of codes in the fields of bankruptcy, 
intellectual property, antitrust, banking regulation, securities and tax law.
20 The reason for the 
increasing codification in Common Law jurisdictions, in the words of Guido Calabresi, is that “the 
courts are not capable of writing speedily enough most of the rules that a modern society apparently 
needs” (Calabresi, 1985). 
One of the main differences between the United States and the European Union regarding 
the enforcement of environmental laws has to be found not only in the structural mode of operating 
                                                 
20 See Mattei U, Comparative Law and Economics, University of Michigan Press, Michigan, 1997 at 101-21.   14
of the two legal systems but also in the institutional context. In Europe it is possible to observe a 
certain degree of reluctance to pursue a firm or individual under criminal law. There are few cases 
brought, particularly in relation to the population and number of firms. The ratio is higher in the 
U.S., where after two warnings, and if there is insufficient compliance, automatically a civil case is 
initiated; if some knowing intent or fraud is found, then, the individual or company is pursued under 
criminal law. Instead of employing criminal sanctions, Europe has traditionally preferred to use 
administrative and civil enforcement, more flexible than a lengthy criminal trial, to ensure 
regulatory compliance by its industries. In fact, the European legal practice shows that 
imprisonment is rarely used or only used in cases in which fines are not paid; even when prison 
sanctions are imposed, they are relatively low on average and often suspended on probation 
(IMPEL, 2000).
21 In the IMPEL (European Union Network for the Implementation and 
Enforcement of Environmental Law) Report (2000), it is argued that one main reason for the 
preferences for fines and the relatively low average of the criminal penalties is the fact that most 
offences are of a minor nature and the offenders are often first time offenders. 
Thus, criminal enforcement has not been as necessary in Europe where the principal 
methods of inducing compliance with environmental regulations have been civil remedies. Civil 
enforcement, however, generally has focused on achieving compliance with emission standards and 
criminal enforcement is still needed to deter violations by companies that handle environmentally 
harmful substances. 
There is still a tendency in European countries for enforcement authorities and firms to work 
together to resolve the compliance problems without formal enforcement actions, but the behavior 
line is slowly changing toward the use of stronger mechanism, in large part because of the 
recognition that many EU environmental laws are not being enforced (Kubasek, Browne and 
Williamson, 2000). The European Commission is strengthening the implementation and 
enforcement of environmental laws in all the member states  
                                                 
21 IMPEL Network, Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Law in the European Union, Report 2000.   15
In understanding why criminal prosecutions in Europe are less frequent and in analyzing the 
differences in enforcement strategies in the U.S. and Europe, several considerations have to be 
made. First of all, I shall maintain the public opinion regarding the criminalization of pollution and 
the public desire for prosecutions is different in the two countries. A variety of others factors, 
moreover, can contribute to explain this divergence in enforcement strategy,
22 including cultural 
differences, different organizational structures, the timing of major pollution accidents, and 
different regulatory approaches related to the essence of common law and civil law systems. 
 
4. An Efficiency Comparison  
  For better evaluating the fundamental features of common law and civil law systems is 
necessary analyzing them in the light of efficiency.  
  The theory of optimal enforcement of laws is based on a particular concept of justice: justice 
as efficiency (maximization of the social planner’s objective function resulting from individuals’ 
decision of committing a crime).
23 Most models of optimal enforcement of laws focus on the 
maximization of social welfare as the objective of public policy. In order to achieve the socially 
optimum level of deterrence, a fundamental result is implied by the fact that the fine should be 
maximal since it is supposed to be a costless transfer whereas imprisonment is costly. 
  In application, however, the problem is very complex. Polinsky and Shavell (2000) use a 
series of simplifying assumptions to show that the optimal fine is the maximal fine and that it is 
optimal to supplement a fine with an imprisonment term if the maximal fine is not very large and 
the marginal cost of imprisonment is sufficiently small.
24 Under the assumption of perfect 
information on behalf of the social planner concerning each individual’s wealth, and of costless 
means of enforcing fines, the optimal fine is the maximal fine.
25 Frequently, fines cannot be 
                                                 
22 Demougin and Schwager (2003) find two peculiar observations. Comparing crime statistics and the general law 
enforcement expenditures between the United States and the member states of the European Union, it emerges that even 
though law enforcement in the U.S. is much higher than in Europe, crime rates are generally higher in the U.S. The 
different pattern for these behaviors is a challenge to understand; the arguments range from the analysis of the formal 
justice system to less informal institutions like, community etc.   16
imposed costlessly and in some cases cannot be imposed at all. For example, when fines cannot be 
used to deter, because the appropriate fine exceeds the assets of violators, imprisonment should 
frequently be employed as the form of penalty. 
Some common arguments that are considered against the use of fines are the following. Fines 
could be “unjust” because the wealthy individuals are able to pay fines, whereas the poor serve jail 
sentences. A second argument is that the typical criminal has extremely low wealth. Fines are more 
useful for crimes that are committed by the rich, since they have more resources to pay fines. As a 
result, feasible fines might be so small as to be inefficient as deterrents. Another argument for the 
use of prisons rather than fines is the value of incapacitation of repeat offenders. The practice of 
punishing repeat offenders more severely than first offenders demonstrates that by imprisoning 
individuals for a longer time, society can expect to prevent more crimes during their period of 
imprisonment than it would do if it imprisoned first offenders, whose propensities are harder to 
predict, for the same period. The same prison resources attain a greater reduction in crime.
26 The 
fact that an individual has committed previous crimes makes society more confident that he is really 
guilty of the crime with which is charged. A final argument for the explanation of the limited use of 
fines is that the government cannot enforce fines except under the threat of prison sentences. 
Fines are useful when the social externality of the crime is small relative to the enforcement 
and incarceration costs. Polinsky and Shavell have incorporated notions of the fairness of sanctions 
into the standard theory of enforcement: a concern for fairness not only has a direct effect on the 
choice of sanctions but also influences the optimal probability of enforcement.
27 
Combination of fine and imprisonment can be useful, because they allow the social planner to 
substitute a fine for some portion of the socially costly jail sentence, in order to minimize the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
23 See Garoupa Nuno, “The Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement”, Journal of Economic Survey, 11, pp.267-295, 1997. 
24 See Polinsky Mitchell A., Shavell Steven, “The optimal use of fine and imprisonment”, Journal of Public Economics, 
24, pp. 880-891, 1984. 
25 Klein Alexander, “Jail or Fine –Let Them Choose”, Paper, University of Munich, January 19, 2000. 
26 See Posner Richard A., “An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law”, Columbia Law Review, 85, pp. 1193-1231, 
1985. 
27 See Polinsky Mitchell A., Shavell Steven, “The Fairness of Sanctions: Some Implications For Optimal Enforcement 
Policy”, American Law and Economics Review, 2, pp. 223-237, 2000.   17
enforcement expenditures. In this context, the federal sentencing guidelines represent a strong 
limitation in judicial discretion use. One negative consequence is that judges cannot tailor 
punishments to the specific situation of individual criminals.
28 
On efficiency grounds, criminal enforcement strategies can control pollution risks and deter 
violators as well as administrative and civil enforcement actions even though the latter tend to 
involve more frequent but more flexible litigations.
29 Another element of the analysis concerns the 
issue whether the number of cases could be socially excessive (there will be a litigation explosion?) 
or perhaps socially inadequate. 
Before giving some opinion in deciding between most efficient enforcement systems, it is 
worthwhile to consider the relative economics merits of enforcement strategies respectively in 
common law and in civil law jurisdictions. The following table can be helpful in understanding the 
different aspects that can play an important role in deciding the most desirable system.  
 
5. Some Concluding Remarks  
The choice of the right combination of a regulatory framework and a legal framework to 
implement an environmental policy is surely a difficult task, which requires structured analysis in 
order to model the interactions between different decision makers, such as governments, firms and 
regulators. Moreover, the efficiency of a legal system with its rules and its normative behaviors is 
another crucial aspect of the overall optimal enforcement problem. These issues and the profound 
historical differences between the regulatory systems of the United States and Europe have played 
an important role in the different patterns of environmental enforcement; it is essential, then, to 
conquest the right consciousness to understand these differences and to consider that public 
consensus is, above all, what makes tendency. 
                                                 
28 See Levitt Steven D., “Incentive Compatibility Constraints as an Explanation for the Use of Prison Sentences Instead 
of Fines”, International Review of Law and Economics, 17, 179-192, 1997. 
29 See Cory Dennis, Livingston M., Northrop H., “Agricultural Contamination of Arizona Groundwater: The Case 
against Liability without Fault”, paper presented at the Southwestern Economic Association Annual Conference, Texas, 
March 2000.   18
Probably the more aggressive enforcement adopted by the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency compared to the European Union institutions, derives from the fact that American 
industries are philosophically opposed, as Lofton (2001) says, to environmental regulation and only 
coercion or the treat of coercion works to assure compliance with environmental laws.. The relative 
willingness of the Europeans to cooperate with regulatory authorities has been indicative of a much 
broader acceptance of public authority. Europe and the United States have developed regulatory and 
enforcement approaches best suited to the culture and values in each countries: the cooperative 
approach works in Europe because there is not a provoking attitude toward public authority, a 
stronger deterrence approach is more suitable to U.S. where industry is highly competitive and less 
inclined to accept the guidance of government or public authorities. 
In Europe, in fact, the general tendency of less criminal enforcement is due, also, to several 
other reasons, such as for example, to the fact that, in many European countries there is still a 
substantial degree of unfamiliarity of judges in this relatively new field of environmental law, and 
that the moral blame on the environmental offences is not felt, perhaps, as being very high.  
It is clear that the role of enforcer’s authorities and legal institutions in promoting 
compliance becomes extremely important since their approaches indicate and influence economic 
and social values; enforcing a law criminally tends undoubtedly to send a stronger message, 
compared to the administrative and civil enforcement, on the fact that compliance is important and 
drives toward the development of more robust social norms of compliance. However, criminal 
penalties may not be appropriate for violations that are too minor to focus government resources on 
the legal process necessary to impose those sanctions.  
These structural differences in law enforcement and substantive law are critical in order for 
the environmental policies to be effective, since so much is at stake environmentally and 
economically. The economic effects of the different enforcement approaches, therefore, deserve 
particular consideration in terms of cost and benefits to be balanced in order to maximize social 
welfare and the implications that the legal institutions can play in this sense are enormous,   19
depending on how they decide to enforce environmental wrongdoers and what types of sanctions 
they may impose for violations. 
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